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not suggest that I can propose a means out of this difficult debate, I would like to resituate it. This means initially examining the cultural defenses that prevent us from thinking beyond the true/false binary of memory. Primary among these defenses are the central role that experience continues to play in the core concepts of feminism (and the subsequent moral trumping ground this produces), the equation of memory and experience, and the cultural coding of forgetting as a loss or negation of experience.
Questions of Criteria
The debate over recovered memory has raised fundamental questions about the criteria for establishing evidence of past acts and the relationship of memory to experience. In the field of psychology, memory has been the focus of a broad array of studies. However, there is considerable disagreement about whether or not these studies apply to contexts of abuse, trauma, and repression. For instance, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus has studied the changeable aspects of memory. Because of her work on the unreliability of witnesses' memories of particular incidents, Loftus has been a favored expert witness in criminal trials and a controversial figure in the recovered memory debate. Loftus's memory studies indicate both the instability and suggestiveness of memory-the ways in which postevent information can change someone's memory of an incident and the ease with which memories of childhood events can be suggested.7 However, she has been criticized for the fact that her studies cannot measure traumatic experience. For instance, critics argue that a study that successfully implants childhood memories of being lost in a shopping mall cannot even remotely be equated with experiences of long-term sexual abuse. There have been only a small number of empirical studies that examine the question of memory repression. These studies demonstrate that somewhere between 20 and 60 percent of people who now remember abuse say that there was a point in the past when they had forgotten it.8 However, a lack of corroboration haunts empirical studies precisely because what is being remembered (an original experience or a false memory) is contested.9 While these studies suggest in a partial way the complex range of responses to remembering and forgetting abuse, they also indicate the inability of empirical evidence to address the status of these memories. What could such a study be?
Under close scrutiny, potential criteria for evidence, such as corroborating witnesses, physical evidence of abuse, and believability of a story, become highly problematic. Sexual abuse yields no other witnesses, other than its participants, precisely because it is an act that takes place behind closed doors. In cases where memories have been recovered years later, The Remembering of Forgetting usually by women in their twenties and thirties who are remembering abuse from infancy until their teenage years, physical evidence is not possible to attain. As for the believability of an individual story, this poses perhaps the most problematic criterion. Many of these memories that seem implausible must be viewed in the larger context of abuse in which truly unbelievable acts can take place within families. As FBI Agent Kenneth Lanning wrote in his report, Investigator's Guide to Allegations of "Ritual" Child Abuse, in 1983 and 1984, when I first began to hear stories of what sounded like satanic or occult activity in connection with allegations of sexual victimization of children (allegations that have come to be referred to most often as "ritual" child abuse), I tended to believe them. I had been dealing with bizarre, deviant behavior for many years and long since realized that almost anything is possible. Just when you think that you have heard it all, along comes another strange case.10
It is at the juncture between a story that is "true to life" and the devastating potential of "true" stories to be "false" and "false" stories "true" that this debate must be resituated. To move beyond the true/false dichotomy means to think of these memories along a continuum. Ironically, it is FBI Agent Lanning who proposes just such a model for thinking about ritual abuse, "a continuum of possible activity" (although he does so with the intent that law enforcement officials discover where along the continuum each case can be situated). I propose that these memories be understood along a continuum of cultural memory, spanning from actual experience to remembered experience, with the understanding that these locations are impossible to measure. To say that recovered memories are part of cultural memory means, among other things, that the question of their origins and their relationship to experience must necessarily be thought of as a complex mix of narrative, displacement, shared testimony, popular culture, rumor, fantasy, and collective desire. All recovered memories are part of cultural memory; even those that are not derived from specific instances of abuse are still elements of the memory landscape that we inhabit. To remember something is an experience.
Displacement and Expansion
The debate over recovered memory exposes the profound ways in which memory is perceived to be fundamental to identity and social process. While the instability of memory, its constant reconstruction, and its integration with fantasy have been widely discussed, memory is still popularly conceived as a sacred and pure text. The idea of memory storage is a sig-nificantly comforting image, precisely because forgetting seems counter to subject formation. While the concept of repression suggests that we forget, it is also based on the idea that memory retrieval is not only possible but healing. Yet recovered memory demands that we ask: What is an experience that is not remembered? What is a memory that doesn't need an experience?
In one of the most famous cases of recovered memory, two young women in Olympia, Washington, first accused their father, Paul Ingram, of abuse and then their mother and several other men of running a satanic cult, sacrificing babies, raping them, and forcing them to have abortions.11 Psychologist Richard Ofshe, who was hired by the prosecution, discovered in the course of his examination of Ingram the power of suggestion.12 Confronted with his daughters' accusations, Ingram was unable to believe they were lying. Ofshe presented Ingram with a fake scenario, in which Ingram had supposedly made his girls have sex with their brother, and Ingram eventually produced a detailed description of the scene. This case demonstrates not only the suggestibility of memory but the desire to narrativize. Whose "memory" was Paul Ingram producing at that moment?
In another high-profile case, the issue is the possibility that memories of abuse can proliferate into other memories. The case of George Franklin, who was convicted of the murder of eight-year-old Susan Nason twenty years after the fact on the evidence of the recovered memories of his daughter, Eileen Franklin Lipsker, was initially held up as an example of a case in which recovered memories were proven to be verifiable. Yet this verdict is highly contested and has since been overturned.13 At the same time, there is no debate about the fact that George Franklin was an abusive father. Some critics have suggested that Lipsker's memories of her father murdering Nason are in fact a rescripting of these other memories of abuse that were transferred onto the traumatic loss of her childhood friend.
Both of these cases point to the potential for memory to be expanded (through suggestion) and displaced (from one abusive act to another). Viewed along a continuum of memory, these are mutable narratives that can morph into new forms, new stories. In this, they are not exceptional but quite ordinary.
Traumatic Memory and Narrative Form
How does one narrate pain, in particular a pain that makes one feel abandoned in society? Many recovered memories seem elusive, needing time and work to reemerge. This has been cause for skepticism, yet fragmentation is a primary quality of traumatic memories. Until recently, research
The Remembering of Forgetting on trauma was focused primarily on the trauma of male war veterans. It was through the work of feminists such as Judith Herman in her book Trauma and Recovery that the politically important connection between the collective trauma of war and the individual trauma of sexual assault and abuse was made. 14 The trauma/dissociation model, as developed by Pierre Janet and reiterated by contemporary psychiatrists such as Herman, is central to the recovered memory debate. Traumatic memory is depicted as "prenarrative," or, one could argue, prerepresentational. In certain cases, this prenarrative state may manifest as a form of reenactment. This is described in Janet's well-known case of Irene, a young woman who initially could not acknowledge her mother's death and remained dissociated from her feelings of grief. Instead of remembering her mother's death, she reenacted her actions of the night her mother died.15 Janet helped this woman to eventually "tell the story" of this traumatic night and to feel her emotions of grief and abandonment.
The work of confronting traumatic memories is thus to give them representational form and to integrate them into one's life narrative. Herman writes, "The goal of recounting the trauma story is integration, not exorcism.... The fundamental premise of the psychotherapeutic work is a belief in the restorative power of truth-telling."16 Testimony is the means through which this process takes place. The term traumatic memory is thus a kind of oxymoron; the traumatic event is not initially remembered or represented but is held at bay by dissociation and reenacted without remembering. In these theories, it is narrative integration that produces the memory of the traumatic event (not, for instance, the often inarticulable body memories). It is when they become full-blown narratives that these memories tell stories of blame and guilt.
This concept of healing thus heavily privileges narrative form, which in turn demands the selection of details and the shaping of story elements. Many of the memories recounted by recovered memory proponents begin as barely distinguishable fragments. Traumatic memory is often described as "wordless and static" or as a "series of still snapshots," and depicted as an unedited film, without a script, for which, according to Herman, "the role of therapy is to provide the music and words." Indeed, the equation of memory with cinema permeates these accounts. Therapists say to patients, "let the memory unfold before you, like you are watching a movie."17 Some patients say that at first they see themselves standing and watching the scenes of abuse as if they are watching a movie. And, of course, film and television are not incidental forms of cultural memory in this story-recovered memories have been the basis of several television movies, including Fatal Memories, in which Shelley Long portrays Eileen Franklin Lipsker.
What is striking about many of these stories is the common narrative of memory emergence. First the subject has vague sensations and fragments of images. Then the memories become increasingly ones of abuse and fear, with unidentified figures and perpetrators. Then, finally, the abuser is recognized as the father. That the father emerges as the abuser after a time is read by critics as an inevitable oedipal outcome or by proponents as the truth that was previously too painful to confront.
The commonality of these stories has been used by both sides of the debate to prove their arguments, either as evidence of suggestibility (they are too similar to be true) or proliferation (all these people couldn't be making this up). There is also the common narrative of the moment of confrontation: The unsuspecting parents receive a letter accusing them of heinous acts and telling them that they are not allowed to contact the accuser, their child; they respond with disbelief. Yet the act of denial has also been prescripted; to proponents of recovered memory therapy, it is not evidence of innocence but guilt. Proponents of survivors insist that all sex offenders deny their acts, and that they can do so both vehemently and convincingly. Similarly, as the act of denial is prescripted, so is the state of having no memories: "that you have no memories of abuse does not mean that you were not abused" is a common refrain. These narratives are often constructed as pregiven and inviolable, a story frame into which the rememberer is neatly inserted.18
Recovered memories are not produced in isolation. Rather, they emerge in dialogue with a therapist, or in the context of a therapy group, where testimony falls not on silence but on affirmation. This dynamic draws on the legacy of early second-wave feminism, in which women's consciousness-raising groups allowed women to voice their concerns and struggles in a space where they felt they would not be judged or dismissed. It is also the progeny of the current preoccupation with confession in popular culture, from tabloid journalism to the public testimony of radio and television talk shows. As in any controversy, it is easy to find examples of egregious excess in prodding testimony. There are examples of therapists who construct stories in obvious ways, prodding patients on by saying, "don't worry at this point if these are real or false, just work on remembering." In many of these cases, by the time the memory has been prodded into coherent form, its veracity is no longer under consideration.
That memory is suggestible and that trusted therapists can have an impact on what their clients believe is not surprising. Yet one might also want to ask, why would someone be predisposed to this kind of blatant suggestion? I would like to focus not on the extreme examples of suggestion but on the larger issue raised by the role of testimony.
Memory and Testimony
The capacity of survivors to testify to their experiences of trauma has been a crucial factor in the writing of history. It is through the accounts of survivors that the scenes of genocide and atrocities throughout the world are made visible and demand response. Testimony calls the listeners of the world to conscience and provides a crucial element in social justice.
Testimony involves a constitutive relationship between a speaker and a listener. The recording of testimonies of Holocaust survivors, for instance, has been examined in terms of the role played by the interviewer, who can often prompt the telling of certain memories through their questions. Psychoanalyst Dori Laub has written that the listener is "the blank screen on which the event comes to be inscribed for the first time,"19 and the means through which a memory can be spoken, known, and made real. As such, he defines the listener of traumatic testimony as "a co-owner of the traumatic event," to which they are primary witnesses.
These dynamics of testimony take on a complex set of meanings when they involve a therapist and his or her client. The therapists who work with recovered memories state that their most important role is to believe their clients. In fact, this is a critical aspect of the contract between therapist and client. Belief is often characterized as a "gift" given by the therapist to a patient that authorizes them to give voice to their pain and fears.20 In the case of women remembering, the question of belief is crucially tied to the history of disbelief with which women's testimony has been received, whether in the medical profession, when symptoms and pains were dismissed, or in the professions of psychology and psychoanalysis, where their experiences were traditionally read as hysterical and evidence of fantasy.
The working through of memories between therapist and patient is a process of coauthorship. As such, it produces different kinds of truth. Psychoanalyst Donald Spence has characterized this distinction as narrative truth and historical truth. Spence notes that memories and dreams are visual, and that the process of translating these images into words is one of narrative construction. While that Janet referred to these memories as operating in the "subconscious." In a paper that attempts to retrieve Janet from Freud's shadow, Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart argue that "dissociation reflects a horizontally layered model of the mind: when the subject does not remember a trauma, its 'memory' is contained in an alternate stream of consciousness, which may be subconscious or dominate consciousness, e.g. during traumatic reenactments."24 Is this "horizontal" model one that can fit a woman whose memories of long-term sexual abuse have been completely forgotten for twenty years? The lack of evidence on whether or not dissociation can actually fit the narrative of total prior amnesia told by those with recovered memories has troubled this debate.
The primary element of Freud's legacy that haunts the recovered memory debate is, of course, his discussion of the relationship of hysteria to incidents of childhood sexual abuse. This is much discussed and hotly debated territory, which I hardly need to reiterate here. It is used by antiFreudians as an example of Freud's hypocrisy.25 Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Judith Herman, among others, suggest that Freud initially believed that his female patients had been sexually abused, indeed that sexual abuse was the key to hysteria, and then recanted that position and attributed the hysteria to repressed fantasies because he lacked the courage to take this unpopular position.
It is precisely Freud's rethinking of the seduction theory through the question of fantasy that is critical to understanding recovered memory and the key to resituating it out of a binary of truth and falsehood. When Freud rethought his position on the seduction theory, he wrote about his "surprise at the fact that in every case the father, not excluding my own, had to be blamed as a pervert" and his concern that "such a widespread extent of perversity toward children is, after all, not very probable."26 Freud and others have noted the absence of "standards of reality" in the unconscious, testifying to the lack of criteria for distinguishing between memory and fantasy within its contents. Jean LaPlanche and J. B. Pontalis have argued that the "psychical reality" of the unconscious and fantasy defined by Freud is set apart from both material reality and the realm of psychological reality. It is not oppositional to material reality but a third coexistent realm. 27 Hence, fantasies can be seen as an integral and concurrent reality. However, fantasies are profoundly disruptive in a social context. Is a fantasy about being raped by one's father as troubling as a memory of being raped? In her memoir, Dancing with Daddy, Betsy Peterson writes that she was so traumatized by writing a short story in which she imagined being molested by her father that "I wanted to believe it: I wanted not to be crazy."28 Are daughters' fantasies of abuse by their fathers more disturbing in our society than actual acts of abuse?
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen has argued that the narratives of 35 Tavris and other critics of recovered memory therapy charge that many of the women who begin this therapy start out with a list of vague reasons-they are unhappy, they feel adrift, they are searching for answers. The "discovery" that they have been molested as a child often forms the "perfect" answer.
What would it mean to construct a feminist position that did not entail belief in all recovered memories as traces of actual experiences of sexual abuse? Can we have a theory of experience that allows for the suggestibility of memory, but which does not label women as hysterics? This debate points to the disabling role experience plays in feminist epistemology. What was initially a concept of experience that provided an intervention in the politics of the personal, location, and gender has become an overriding doctrine of popular feminist discourse. The recovered memory debate demands a rethinking of the relationship of experience to identity formation and the need to consider experience as a form of self-invention and an active social practice. For instance, in what ways are the experiences of sexual abuse in these memories the experiences of adults and not children?
At the heart of this story is the struggle of daughters and fathers, for the accusation by daughters of sexual abuse by fathers is the primary narrative of this debate. Is it evidence of the historical sense of ownership that fathers have felt over their daughters' bodies, a proprietary sense of their role as patriarch to use their daughters for their own sexual gratification? That men have abused their children with a sense of ownership is not contested. Or, is recovered memory evidence of the struggle of daughters, one might say an oedipal struggle, to violently separate from their fathers? Why is it that so many memories of abuse begin with unidentified perpetrators that over time emerge as fathers? This fact prompted disbelief in Freud, but shouldn't we look further?
In reviewing these stories, one cannot help asking, Is the very nature of childhood abusive to women? According to Carol Tavris, recovered memories of sexual abuse are a "brilliant figurative metaphor" for the powerlessness that women feel, the abuse they feel they have experienced as women.36 If recovered memory syndrome means that, despite having no memories, many women are willing to believe that they have been victims of abuse, then it is compelling evidence of the troubling ways in which many women still identify themselves as disempowered. In their search for wholeness, for which memories of abuse provide a certain clue, these women testify to the very incompleteness and emptiness of the present.
To read one's unhappiness and lack of fulfillment as memories is to turn symptoms into memories. The answer that one's unhappiness is attributable to forgotten abuse is also an answer that precludes many other responses. It shifts the focus from the potential of a social movement to rethink gender power relations to contained instances of familial abuse. As a social movement, it is profoundly depoliticizing. Tavris The recovery movement has emerged in a larger social context in which social empathy is rare and social policies are increasingly draconian. The cultural romanticization of the survivor, whether in popular culture or in the context of the popular psychology industry, can be seen as a response to this lack of social concern. The capacity to render the homeless person or the welfare recipient invisible is thus contingent upon engaging with an identity status that allows oneself to feel that anger, resentment, and the right to speak seemingly afforded those who have been oppressed.
Recovered Memory as Cultural Memory
To examine the cultural defenses that keep the recovered memory debate within the limited binary of truth and falsehood also means reconfiguring the means by which we understand the relationship of individual memory to cultural memory. To acknowledge the function of memory as an inventive social practice is also to reckon with the traffic between personal and cultural memories. To pose the question, Whose memories are these? is thus not to claim that the individual recovered memories of women are fabricated but that they, like all memories, are part of an ever changing script that cannot be separated from the images that circulate within popular culture, the discourses of women and sexuality, and the debates over the status of the American family.
The families that have been accused by women with recovered memories for the most part look strikingly alike. They are mostly white, middle-to upper-middle-class nuclear families. They are often presented in documentaries as perfect emblems of the American dream, their rituals of birthdays and Christmases captured on innumerable reels of Super-8 film. Each one is presented as formerly believing in its perfection, goodness, and coherence as a family unit.
What is the nature of this American family? What does it mean for so many families to be locked in this story, not of absentee, distracted parents, conflict avoidance, casual sibling cruelty, or unfulfilled emotional needs, but of rape, forced oral sex, threats of mutilation, and, finally, gang rape and human sacrifice. Many of these families have had to confess their lack of perfection-yes, I was an angry mother, yes, I was withholding with my children, yes, I may have done a few things that could be misinterpreted as crossing boundaries, after all, I came of age in the 1960s; it's true I was an alcoholic. But they all proclaim they never sexually abused their children. This is, in many ways, an all-American story of the dysfunctional American family-the family of the nation.
The recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse and satanic cult ritual both respond to and produce cultural memory and concepts of nationhood. Through the dissemination of these stories in popular psychology books, TV talk shows, television movies, novels, memoirs, and Internet discussion groups, individual memories both become cultural remembrances and are permeated with them.
In particular, the debate over satanic cults and ritual abuse reveals the ways in which individual and cultural memory converge. While the stories of satanic cults may seem easy to dismiss because of their implausible elements, it would be a mistake to underestimate their social impact. As 43 That same year, rumors began to circulate that Procter and Gamble was promoting satanism through elements of its logo (these elements have since been removed). Throughout the 1980s there were several television specials on "devil worshipers," the most well-known of which was a Geraldo Rivera special titled "Devil Worship," which aired in 1988. Each of these has affected the proliferation of similar stories and has prompted new memories.44 Perhaps it is not incidental that Freud was interested in the question of witch-hunting and devil worship, and that, a century ago, he decided that his patients were (coincidentally) having similar experiences. 45 The cultural memory that feeds the belief in satanic cults can be charted as well through certain events of twentieth-century history. Satanic cult imagery is derived from many sources, which are imbued with the paranoid tone of conspiracy cultures. There are many enemies here: the cults are said to have learned their brainwashing (and memoryblocking) techniques from Nazi scientists secretly brought to the United States by the CIA.46 While many of these narratives are standard conspiracy theory interweavings, in the context of recovered memory syndrome they converge in particularly consequential ways. These are specifically gendered images: rape, forced abortion, electrodes attached to vaginas, dark pits with snakes and human body parts, and the ritualistic murder of newborn infants, who are conceived from rape and whose sole purpose is to be sacrificed to Satan. These indicate another highly problematic source for the cultural memory of satanic cults: the imagery of the antiabortion movement. The babies that are conceived only to be sacrificed, the endless imagery of the blood of the newborn, the dismembered infants-these are images that have permeated American culture since the first photographs of a fetus were produced in 1965. They form a part of cultural memory and haunt the subconscious of young women who may be plagued by guilt for many reasons. Indeed, it is precisely over the issue of fetuses conceived from incest and rape (like those imaged in satanic cults) that the abortion debate now hinges. The fetus has become a powerful figure of endangerment in twentieth-century American culture. The babies who form a central aspect of satanic cult memories, and of whom no physical evidence has ever been produced, stand in for the abused child (the inner child), who figuratively represents adult unhappiness and lack of fulfillment. The family of satanic cults is, in many ways, the family of the nation, at war over who owns women's bodies.
Cultural Forgetting
Perhaps the most powerful cultural defense that has stymied the recovered memory debate is the prevalent notion of forgetting as a form of illness, a loss of self, and a threat to subjectivity. However, one way to understand recovered memory syndrome as a cultural and national phenomenon is not to see it simply as memory but rather as a form of cultural forgetting. The equation of memory with production and forgetting with negation has limited this debate in profound ways. A central element that binds these stories together is not their remembering but the fact that these memories were forgotten. How, one wants to ask, have so many people repressed these memories? And, why are people so easily convinced that they (and, by extension, the nation) have forgotten? Perhaps we should be asking: What does the act of forgetting produce? What lack is it contingent upon?
The fascination with forgetting in the cold war culture of the 1950s
The Remembering of Forgetting permeates these stories. Nineteen-fifties science fiction portrayed communist identity as a forgetting of the past. The people who forgot who they were in The Invasion of the Body Snatchers were earlier versions of the high priestesses of satanic cults who have been programmed to not remember their brutal acts. Yet the fears enacted in 1950s images of brainwashing and CIA experiments cannot be dismissed simply as cultural paranoia. The power of the narrative of forgetting is precisely what it indicates about subjectivity. For someone to become convinced that they have forgotten crucial experiences of their past is for them to open their subjectivity to profound disrupture. Survivors of trauma often state that they are not the same people that they were before their traumatic experience, implying that critical aspects of their former selves are no longer intact-whoever they were has been forgotten. 47 The forgetting that precedes memory recovery allows for a search for origins and enables oedipal narratives to emerge. Remembering becomes a process of achieving closer proximity to wholeness, of erasing forgetting. Thus, the positioning of memory as a process through which origins are retrieved means positing forgetting as an act of misrecognition. Indeed, it can be said that Oedipus had amnesia, that he had forgotten the essence of his mother when he did not recognize her and set his sad tale into motion. His capacity to forget blinds Oedipus to his origins, and this seals his tragic fate.
Perhaps this is where Freud led us astray, with the narrative power of the oedipal story. Forgetting is not absence or misrecognition in this debate but presence. Recovered memory designates subjectivities that are constituted through forgetting as much as through remembering. This forces us to examine how forgetting is a highly constitutive element of identity and a primary means through which subjectivity is shaped and produced.
Ultimately, the debate over recovered memories exposes the fetishizing and privileging of memory that is the underlying assumption of both psychoanalysis, trauma therapy, and recovered memory therapy. In the case of recovered memories that do not promote healing but rather increase pain and isolation, one has to question the tenet that remembering is equivalent to healing. One of the most striking aspects of many stories of recovered memory is the way in which the memories grow (from vague feelings to suspicions of abuse, from unidentified figures to fathers, from a memory of a touch to satanic rituals of sacrifice and cannibalism) and become, finally, the central activity of someone's life. Unlike the model of repression, where the act of remembering eliminates the hysterical symptoms, or the model of dissociation, where the integration of the memory into narrative allows the subject to deal with the trauma, many of these memories take over lives and leave room for nothing else. They are tyrannical. In some of these cases, the memory itself is the sole source of trauma.
In an extensive analysis of the history of "traumatic cures," Ruth Leys criticizes Herman, van der Kolk, and van der Hart for their embrace of a simplistic Janet model of traumatic memory (in which the memory is reenacted) versus narrative memory (in which the story of the trauma can be told). This is precisely because their deployment of Janet elides the aspects of his methodology that involved helping the patient to forget. She writes:
For Herman and for the modern recovery movement generally, even if the victim of trauma could be cured without obtaining historical insight into the origins of his or her distress, such a cure would not be morally acceptable. Rather the victim must be helped to speak the horrifying truth of the pastto "speak of the unspeakable"-because telling that truth has not merely a personal therapeutic but a public or collective value as well.48
The collective sharing of abusive narrative is seen by these theorists as a moral imperative, even at the expense of the individual. Leys goes on to note the ways in which, even in the case of the now-famous Irene, Janet's work depended on a combination of "assimilation and liquidation" of the memory, aspects of his techniques that he himself obscured and that contemporary proponents of the trauma/dissociation model have distorted.
Janet often replaced patients' traumatic memories with screen memories. For instance, for a patient with hysterical symptoms who had been traumatized by sleeping next to a girl with a diseased face, he used hypnosis to replace the memory with the image of a girl with a beautiful face. As Ian Hacking writes: Janet was flexible and pragmatic, while it was Freud who was the dedicated and rather rigid theoretician in the spirit of the Enlightenment. ... In the matter of lost and recovered memories, we are heirs of Freud and Janet. One lived for Truth, and quite possibly deluded himself a good deal of the time and even knew he was being deluded. The other, a far more honorable man, helped his patients by lying to them, and did not fool himself that he was doing anything else.49 Janet's "pragmatic" approach, which combined both integration and erasure, addresses the problematic definition of memory as truth telling and the role of confession in both psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. It raises the important question: when is it better to forget?
To resituate the recovered memory debate outside of a binary of truth and falsehood, of memories as fantasies versus memories as recepThe Remembering of Forgetting tacles of experiences, we must begin by examining the long-standing equation of memory with healing, whether as the truth narrative of the individual or the cultural healing of collective testimony. Memory needs to be defetishized and forgetting undemonized. This means understanding all recovered memories, regardless of their foundation in original experience, as both memories and experiences. It also means recognizing that empirical evidence will not provide answers to this phenomenon, and that we must consider the cultural aspects of these memories-the ways in which they both permeate and are permeated by cultural images. Both Spence's concept of narrative truth and LaPlanche and Pontalis's notion of psychical reality provide models for thinking about memories as concurrent realities.
All recovered memories exist within a continuum of cultural memory. All are experiences that speak to contemporary tensions and trauma, a cultural climate of disempowerment, and a lack of political will. They demand that we examine the relationship of memory to experience by asking these questions: What is an experience that we cannot remember? What is a memory that does not need an experience? These memories belong to all of us. What we can learn from them will not come from ascribing them falsehood, but rather from examining the abuse they attest to, the fears they give voice to, and the desires they fulfill. 13. The Franklin case was overturned in November 1995, and in July 1996 Franklin was released when prosecutors decided they did not have enough evi-
